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Taking Uncertainty Seriously 
 
Classical Realism and National Security 
 
 
Those who make decisions about national security have to make forecasts, as best they can, 
even though forecasts are often wrong and life is full of surprises. While this problem is 
inevitable, policymakers do have control over the assumptions they bring to the task. As I 
argue, in recent years they have taken a troubling course. In a major recent strategic review in 
2010, and again in 2015, British policymakers rightly affirmed the uncertainty of the world, 
but implicitly regarded their own state as a bringer of order into chaos, somehow 
transcending the non-linearity of international life. The unintended consequences that 
interventions have sown suggests this confidence is misplaced. Classical realism is a useful 
corrective to this temptation. Modern social science focuses predominantly on finding 
patterns in order to reduce uncertainty and hone imperfect predictive powers. That is a 
reasonable and necessary project, even if agency, contingency and the limits on knowledge 
mean that foresight can only modestly improve. Classical realism, however, counsels that 
governments should go beyond attempts to improve foresight. Those making decisions 
should insure against the fallibility of their assumptions, marshal their power more 
conservatively, and prepare for the likelihood of predictive failure by developing the 
intellectual capability to react to the unknown. 
 
In the field of ‘national security’, practitioners and observers speak often of a 
dangerously uncertain and non-linear world. If non-linearity is 'a critical point at which 
expectations (predictions) induced by a prior trend suddenly confront alteration in that trend, 
indeed, an abrupt inversion'1, then western defence doctrines agree that a condition of ‘non-
linearity’ defines today’s security environment. The apprehension of uncertainty2 is a core 
part of the strategic doctrines of modern democracies in the West and beyond, such as the 
                                                            
For their advice in the preparation of this article, I am grateful to the audience that was subjected to an earlier 
version of the argument at the University of Exeter in March 2015; to the Strategy and Security Institute at the 
University of Exeter for its support; to the anonymous reviewers for their critical feedback; and to those 
colleagues and friends who influenced my thinking, by accident or by design: David Blagden, Jonathan Golub, 
Burak Kadercan, Tarak Barkawi, Paul Newton, Huw Bennett, Hew Strachan, Catarina Thomson, Sergio 
Catignani, Tim Vlandas, Andreas Behnke, Joseph Parent, Daniel Levine, David Galbreath, Michael Horowitz, 
Richard Ned Lebow, and Robert Saunders.   
1 Charles F. Doran, 'Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of Forecasting in International Relations and 
Economics' International Studies Review 1:2 (1999), pp.11-41, p.11. 
2 'Uncertainty' has multiple meanings, but refers here non-pejoratively to ignorance over the capabilities and 
intentions of others. 
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UK’s National Security Strategy, the US’ Quadrennial Defence Reviews, and in the official 
documents from European NATO states such as Germany, France and Spain and beyond, to 
Australia and Singapore.3 In our dynamic, interdependent era, it is argued, where once 
security strategy was a response to specific and current adversaries, now the terrors are not yet 
fully realised. They can merge and metastasize in unforeseeable ways, and constitute the 
notorious ‘unknown unknowns.’ In place of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, we now 
allegedly face a more diffuse, kind of systemic turbulence, made brutally tangible by terrorist 
attacks, epidemics and the global financial crisis. 
 
As well as being dominant within modern government, the concern with uncertainty is 
part of a wider intellectual account of today’s sources of insecurity. This is reflected in the 
growing literature on ‘risk’, which regards the globalised complexity of things as a defining 
feature of ‘late modernity.’4
 
 Likewise in security studies literature, shocks from revolutions 
to financial meltdowns bring renewed attention to uncertainty, its causes and consequences.5
 
 
 
Yet this is only one half of the equation. Former Secretary of Donald Rumsfeld may 
be most renowned for his identification of the ‘unknown unknowns.’ But his attitude to 
uncertainty was selective. As he celebrated the power of a transformed US military in 2002, 
Rumsfeld argued that adaptability was critical 'in a world defined by surprise and 
uncertainty.' Yet months later, he advised categorically that the coming Gulf War would last 
'Five days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn't going to last any longer than 
that.'6
 
 
 
Rumsfeld’s attitude typifies a wider trend, where Western states aver that the world 
is uncertain while showing an unwarranted confidence in their own capacity to impose order 
                                                            
3 See Timothy Edmunds, ‘British Civil-Military Relations and the Problem of Risk’ International Affairs 88:2 
(2012), pp.265-282; Anne Hammerstad & Ingrid Boas, ‘National Security Risks? Uncertainty, austerity and 
other logics of risk in the UK Government’s National Security Strategy’ Cooperation and Conflict (2014), 
pp.1-17. 
4 M.J. Williams, ‘Insecurity studies, reflexive modernisation and the risk society’ Cooperation and Conflict 43:1 
(2008), pp.57-59; Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992); Christopher 
Coker, War in an Age of Risk (New York: Polity, 2009); Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: 
Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
pp.203-206. 
5 Brian Rathbun, 'Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Concept in 
International Relations Theory' International Studies Quarterly 51:3 (2007), pp.533-557; David M. Edelstein, 
'Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the rise of Great Powers' Security Studies 12:1 (2002), 
pp.1-40; John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004); Charles F. Parker & Eric K. Stern, 'Blindsided? September 11 and the Origins of 
Strategic Surprise,' Political Psychology 23:3 (2002), pp. 601-630. 
6 Donald H. Rumsfeld, 'Transforming the Military' Foreign Affairs 81:3 (2002), 20-32 p.22; 'Rumsfeld: It Would 
Be A Short War' CBS News 15 November 2002. 
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on it. A reading of one of the most prominent and holistic security reviews of our time, the 
British ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’ (SDSR) of 2010, demonstrates how and 
why the state takes this problematic attitude to the security environment. 
 
SDSR is a salient case for several reasons. First, it was a major strategic reassessment 
that attracted a high volume of expert discussion  around  futurology and risk, attempting to 
institutionalise ‘horizon scanning’ through the creation of a National Security Council and a 
‘Risk Register.’ It laid down the essential concepts and assumptions that would frame its 
successor, SDSR 2015. It is also an internationally representative case. SDSR represents the 
most pronounced articulation of a body of assumptions and methodologies around the 
concepts of risk and uncertainty that also appear in codified strategies published throughout 
the Western security community. This makes it instructive beyond the debate in Britain. The 
concepts of risk and uncertainty that underpin it also derive from a wider international 
dialogue within NATO. And finally, SDSR happened at a crisis moment that brought 
problems of strategy and chaos into focus, where the state was fearful of its financial position 
and the ambiguity about what might happen next. This came at a juncture that other states 
face, where the demand for predictive scientific guidance over the allocation of scarce 
resources collides with the perception that today’s world is unforeseeable. 
 
As I demonstrate, the same policymakers and official documents that invoke 
uncertainty also attempt to foist certainty onto the world through a self-assured vision of 
anticipatory action. Architects of 'national security strategy' describe international life as 
dangerously unpredictable. They then assume the capacity to prevent threats and control 
problems upstream in a world that is scientifically legible. They deploy techniques, like risk 
assessment methodologies, to anticipate the future and impose clarity onto their environment. 
They make use of social scientific hypotheses, such as ‘democratic peace theory’ in their 
ambition to promote peace by exporting market democracy. This is not a logical 
contradiction. One can view the world as unpredictable while still trying to predict. But it 
does represent a conflicting set of attitudes. Policymakers’ fearful anticipation of uncertainty 
when talking about the world contrasts with their confident pronouncements when talking 
about their own states’ role in shaping it, suggesting an implicit belief in their own 
prescience, an unexamined assumption that their actions are exempt from the chaos they 
identify in the international system. SDSR 2015 reaffirms this outlook, stating that the 
unexpected is increasingly likely, while giving the UK an anticipatory role as security 
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provider and a force of benevolent prevention that spreads ‘good governance.’
7  
 
How can we best explain this? This goes beyond western governments reacting to 
the ever-more complex environment as it is. As a closer examination of a representative 
case reveals, a more ambitious - and dangerous- assumption frames security strategy. It is 
based on a coherent, though dangerous, ideological premise, that the West – by virtue of 
being the far-sighted guardian of world order- brings order into a chaotic world.  
 
In making this move, policymakers exempt the West as a strategic actor from the 
very phenomenon they identify in the external environment: non-linearity. In a truly non-
linear world, one’s own actions are also implicated in the reproduction of uncertainty, and 
the West too can unwittingly be an agent of chaos. But contemporary visions of national 
security ‘risk management’ lose sight of this possibility. 
 
We are left with a world view that drives a specific logic for action. It underpins 
anticipatory security practice, from greater use of development as an instrument of security, 
to preventive ‘upstream’ engagement, to anticipatory war, and increased state surveillance. 
These initiatives flow from a common assumption, that radical uncertainty places a premium 
on action over inaction, the expenditure of power over restraint, the early forestalling of 
problems over the ability to react. Yet the ‘preventive’ ambition to tame a chaotic world back 
into order is at odds with the poor record of forecasting by all governments, western ones 
included, despite efforts to ‘predict better’; with the unintended consequences of ‘early’ 
intervention, and with the profound difficulties of strategic planning even over the medium 
term. 
 
So if our efforts to forecast based on known patterns are likely to fall short, how can 
we wisely prepare? Classical realism, in particular the realism of Prussian general and 
theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and German-American political scientist Hans 
Morgenthau (1904-1980), offers a more promising resource for handling uncertainty, and an 
antidote to attempts to reduce strategic planning to an unreflective form of technocratic risk 
management. Where contemporary social science seeks to reduce uncertainty with new 
methods and tools, classical realists see it as a dilemma inherent to the limits on knowledge. 
                                                            
7 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (TSO: London, 2015), p.6. 
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Foresight can only be marginally improved. Shocks will come. Classical realism is sensitive 
to self-inflicted wounds that flow from responding with excessive certainty to ambiguous 
situations in an anarchic world.8
 
If strategy requires concentration and limitation, failure to 
articulate limitations can lead a state to spread its resources thinly to hold down risks 
everywhere, exhausting itself and undermining the ability to react to the unexpected. 
 
Confronted by nonlinearity, though, Clausewitz and Morgenthau did not throw their 
hands in the air. To prepare for the unknown, states should perform two tasks. They should 
educate the intuitive judgement of decision-makers in coping with the unforeseen. And they 
should approach national security as a public conversation over the orientation of the country, 
grounded in dialogue between expert and general will, to guide preparation and response. 
 
 
This article proceeds in two parts. Firstly, I re-examine SDSR as a strategic review 
typical of a wider trend, demonstrating that it preaches uncertainty but presumes 
foreknowledge, amounting to an ideology of western power. Secondly, I demonstrate that a 
fresh reading of the interventions of Clausewitz and Morgenthau in the defence debates of 
their time offers a more reflexive, prudent basis on which to prepare for the unknown. 
 
Part I: The Certainties of National Security 
  
 
The demands of major war in the twentieth century gave rise to the ‘national security state’, a 
complex bureaucratic apparatus designed to mobilise resources to generate capability in 
pursuit of security interests.9
 
 As well as generating material power, the security state attempts 
to develop the ability to forecast, through institutions like the US National Intelligence 
Council’s ‘Strategic Futures Group.’ Today, the state’s repertoires of prediction and risk 
management derive from multiple sources and inspirations beyond government, made 
possible by new data-intensive technologies. These range from ‘political risk analysis’ in 
business, election forecasting and baseball ‘sabermetrics.’ To some, such innovations promise 
that international relations too can be demystified.10
  
 
                                                            
8 Jennifer Mitzen & Randall Schweller, ‘Knowing the Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War’  
Security Studies 20 (2011), pp.2-35. 
9 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp.193–220; Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 
1930’s (Yale University Press, 1995), p.35. 
10
 John Arquilla, 'Small Cells vs. Big Data' Foreign Policy 22 April 2013; Kenneth Neil Kukier & Viktor Mayer-
Schoenberger, 'The Rise of Big Data: How Its Changing the Way we Think about the World' Foreign Affairs 
92:3 (2013), pp.28-40.  
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Despite these efforts, it is still difficult to predict the time, place and circumstances of 
future crises. It still involves 'deep uncertainty',11 where one can neither weigh nor identify 
the variables confidently in advance. In the field of conflict, the problem is magnified. Lead 
times are long for generating weapons systems and personnel, while the pace of change can 
be rapid and crises sudden. This requires difficult tradeoffs, balancing economic capacity 
with military preparedness, current conflicts with future ones.12
 
Unsurprisingly, planners and 
experts have a poor record of forecasting. Expert predictions succeed at the approximate rate 
of chimps throwing darts at a dart board.13 Major systemic change, like the nature and timing 
of the Cold War's end, catches experts off guard.
14
 Rare contingent 'shocks', like CBRN 
terrorist attacks, cannot be anticipated reliably.15 Even proponents of 'better' prediction argue 
that once forecasts range beyond five years, chances of accuracy plunge.16 
 
In 2010, the problem of 'uncertainty', endlessly recalled, confronted the architects of 
Britain's Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). They had to plot the country's 
capabilities while constrained by financial austerity, clouded by an unsettled 'threat picture', 
dogged by rivalry between military services and with their attention split between current 
wars and future possible ones. Its successor review, SDSR 2015, was rightly commended for 
addressing capability gaps and legacy problems from 2010. But it, too, leant heavily on the 
notions of uncertainty and risk. 
 
 
I trace SDSR through a family of declaratory documents that informed it. Four 
documents constituted the review itself, two preceding ones produced by the Ministry of 
Defence, The Future Character of Conflict (FCOC) and the ‘Green Paper’ Adaptability and 
Partnership,
17
 the main defence planning statement Securing Britain in an Age of 
Uncertainty: The Strategic and Security Defence Review (SDSR),18 and the guiding statement 
                                                            
11
 
 Paul K. Davis, 'Defence Planning and Risk Management in the Presence of Deep Uncertainty' in Paul Bracken 
(ed.) Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons from Risk Management and Risk Assessment (New York: Cambridge 
university Press, 2005), p.170.  
 
12
 Stephan Frühling, Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the next Asia-Pacific War (2014),  
p.194. 
13
 
 Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgement: How Good is it? How Can We Know? (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), p.20.  
14
 John Lewis Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War' International Security 17:3 
(1992-3), pp.5-58.  
15 JASON, Rare Events (McLean, VA: MITRE Corporation, 2007), p.7. 
16 Michael C. Horowitz & Philip Tetlock, 'Trending Upward: How the Intelligence Community can Better See 
into the Future' Foreign Policy 6 September 2012. 
17 Ministry of Defence, Development Concept and Doctrine Center, The Future Character of Conflict  
(Shrivenham: DCDC, 2010); Ministry of Defence, Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic 
Defence Review (Cm 7794, February 2010).  
18 HM Government, Securing Britain.  
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it serves, The National Security Strategy (NSS).
19
 
 
SDSR 2010 displeased observers across the spectrum.20 Critics lamented its legacy of 
aircraft carriers without aircraft, the difficulties of meeting mounting training and equipment 
costs, a reduced escort fleet, an army being hollowed out, a reduced fast jet fleet, and nuclear-
armed submarines deprived of the protective surveillance of maritime patrol aircraft.
21 
 What 
was less discussed, however, was its base assumptions. 
 
This first major review in twelve years was partly an exercise in deficit reduction 
dominated by the Cabinet Office and Treasury,22 conducted against the clock. In the spring of 
2010, against a backdrop of a financial crisis sweeping the Euro-Atlantic world, the 
Conservative opposition promised 'a fundamental reappraisal of Britain’s place in the world 
and how we operate within it as well as of the capabilities we need to protect our security.'23
 
 
Observers saw SDSR as an opportunity for strategic adjustment, to reinvent Britain's 
international role to bring it into line with depleted resources.24 But SDSR could not easily 
perform this balancing act, because of an underlying assumption made explicit before the 
review even began, namely that the question of retrenching commitments was off limits. 
Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague announced that there would be ‘no strategic 
shrinkage’ to harmonise national goals with a weakened economic base. Britain should not 
‘retreat’ or manage ‘decline’, but remain an ambitious power with wide security horizons.
25
 
Narrowing Britain’s horizons would betray the country’s activist, global ambitions. That 
economic weight was shifting to East Asia demanded a 'more ambitious' role. There could be 
'no suggestion' Britain's role could whither26 as it ‘always had global responsibilities and 
global ambitions.’
27
 SDSR was unreceptive to public engagement, as the Ministry of Defence 
                                                            
19 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (London: TSO, 2010); see also the 
recently published National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (London: TSO, 2015). 
20 David Kirkpatrick 'The Next UK Defence Review Must Do Better' RUSI Defence Systems 14:2 (2011), pp.14-
15; House of Commons Defence Committee: Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One – HC 
197: Part 1, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Vol. 1: Report, Together with Formal Minutes and Oral 
Evidence, Volume 1, p.12 para 12. 
21 On the problems encountered by the SDSR, see Andrew M. Dorman, 'Making 2+2=5: The 2010 Strategic 
Defence and Security Review' Defence and Security Analysis 27:1 (2011), pp.77-87. 
22 The SDSR was launched in May and published in October 2010. The previous major review of 1998 took a 
year and was relatively open to external expert opinion: Rob Dover & Mark Pythian, 'The Politics of the 
Strategic Defence and Security Review: Centralisation and Cuts.' 
23 William Hague, 'Britain's Foreign Policy in a Networked World' 1 July 2010, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, London, at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-s-foreign-policy-in-a-networked-world--2. 
24 Hew Strachan, ‘The strategic gap in British defence policy’, Survival 51:4 (2009), pp.49-70; Trevor Taylor, 
'The Essential Choice: Options for Future British Defence' RUSI Journal 155:2 (2010), pp.14-19, p.17.  
25 William Hague, ‘The Foreign Policy Framework of a New Conservative Government' Royal United Services 
Institute 10 March 2010.  
26 William Hague, ‘Opening statement, Foreign Affairs and Defence debate on the Queen’s speech’,  
Hansard, 26 May 2010, Column 174. 
27 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty (London: Cabinet Office, October 2010), 
'Foreword', p3. 
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paid little attention to six thousand submissions from voters, 'a lost opportunity for 
Parliament and the wider public.'
28
 Both rhetoric and process worked to foreclose debate, 
signalling that uncertainty would not intrude on the question of national commitments. 
 
The blanket dismissal of retrenchment was abrupt. While it is possible to ‘under 
balance’ or retrench prematurely, the refocusing of commitments on core security interests 
can also be an effective way to conserve and refocus power, postpone or reverse a precipitous 
fall.29 There have been several, notably successful moments of retrenchment in British 
diplomatic history, such as the conceding of strategic space to the US in its hemisphere at the 
end of the nineteenth century, the handover to the US of military and financial commitments 
to Greece and Palestine from 1947-1950, and the pullback from Britain’s ‘overextended 
chain of bases ‘East of Suez’ in 1966-8.
30
 
 
The government, though, foreclosed this debate, preferring to reduce means in pursuit 
of fixed ends. Though the SDSR directed that the UK needed to be ‘more strategic’, it invited 
debate about the structure and quality of its armed forces, but rejected a review of the scale of 
British ambitions and how to rank the interests those capabilities must serve. To 
sympathisers, improvising while avoiding a revision of goals is a higher form of 'muddling 
through.'
31
 But to critics, to retain global aspirations while making serious reductions in 
capacity was to unbalance means and ends,32 and could not be sufficiently offset by limited 
allied collaboration or 'soft power.' To will the end while reducing the means, to sustain a 
vision of global expeditionary activism with a force structure ill-suited to it, was not 
'muddling through' but sleepwalking. 
 
To assist, the Defence Concept and Doctrine Centre offered FCOC, a document that 
accounts for the complexity of modern conflict while prescribing ways to anticipate it. It 
                                                            
28 James Blitz, Defence and Diplomatic Editor of the Financial Times, Oral Evidence, House of Commons 
Defence Committee, 16 February 2011, Ev 3; this was revealed in a leaked report, SDSR: Lessons Identified 3 
November 2010.  
29 Joseph M. Parent & Paul K. MacDonald, 'Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power 
Retrenchment' International Security, 35:4 (2011), pp.7-44.  
30 Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline 1895-1905 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), pp.170-171; Paul Kennedy, 'A Time to Appease' The National Interest 108 
(2010), pp.7-17.  
31 'A Retreat, but not a Rout' Economist 21 October 2010; Paul Cornish & Andrew Dorman, 'Smart muddling 
through' International Affairs 88:2 (2012), pp.213-222, p.222.  
32 Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, 'First Review of the National Security Strategy', HL Paper 
265/HS 1384 (Session 2010-2012), paragraph 30; House of Commons Defence Committee, The Strategic 
Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy: Sixth Report of Session 2010-2012 volume 1, 
paragraph 12; Professor Michael Clark and Professor Hew Strachan, Defence Committee Minutes of Evidence, 
The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, 16 February 2011, Ev 5; Robert 
Fry, 'Smart Power and the Strategic Deficit' RUSI Journal 159:6 (2014), pp.28-32. 
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describes conflict's 'inherent unpredictability', the impossibility of anticipating the character 
of future conflict given its 'inherently volatile' nature that produced 'wicked problems' which 
lack a clear relationship between cause and effect, all taking place in the realm of 'friction 
and uncertainty.'33 Yet despite these caveats, at both five and 20 year points it forecasts 
drivers of conflict ‘with confidence.’ Affirming uncertainty, FCOC projects from the present 
into the future. It presupposes a fixed future set by the UK's current strategic role, with 
adaptation confined to improving 'agility.' Globalisation will accelerate change and 
interconnect conflict. The UK will be unable to avoid being drawn into operations in 
megacities and heavily populated littoral regions, and by 2020 multi-polarity will be 
underway.34
 
Success in Afghanistan is vital, defeat will undermine the credibility on which 
its deterrence rests, and Britain is 'likely' to fight adversaries armed with CBRN weapons.35 
FCOC also asserts that preventive measures by the UK will effectively mitigate the causes 
and consequences of state failure. Here the document is conflicted. Future prevention will be 
'required', the UK should invest more in it, and it 'will build confidence and local capacity' 
while giving access and understanding. Yet 'even with hindsight, it is difficult to measure the 
effectiveness of prevent activities', making it unclear how we can be confident in prevention 
in the first place.36 
 
The NSS urges 'We must do all we can, within the resources available, to predict, 
prevent and mitigate the risks to our security. For those risks that we can predict, we must act 
both to reduce the likelihood of their occurring, and develop the resilience to reduce their 
impact.' Yet 'we cannot prevent every risk as they are inherently unpredictable.'37
 
Are all risks 
inherently unpredictable, or only some of them, and how can the authors discriminate? Its 
National Security Risk Assessment 'is not a forecast' but goes on to state expectations (about Al 
Qaeda, failed states and Iranian nuclearisation), implicitly based on inferences about the future 
from current trends, based partly on probability, classifying threats into a hierarchy.38 
 
There is a time-picture in NSS of ever greater uncertainty, which is based on a 
corollary that things were once less uncertain. This draws on a mythologised memory of a 
simple Cold War, with 'brutal certainties' and 'predictable threats', 'an existential threat from a 
                                                            
33 FCOC, pp.1, 6, 7, p.38.  
34 FCOC, p.21, 29.  
35 FCOC, pp.16,11.  
36 FCOC pp.27, 36. 
37 NSS, p.25.  
38 NSS, pp.26-31.  
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state adversary through largely predictable military or nuclear means.'39 This is an odd 
portrait. The twilight struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States from 1947 to 
1991 was pervaded by ambiguities, about threat definition (was the enemy a global monolith 
or a divisible set of rivals?) and whether and how the enemy would use its military.40 But 
recalling a false past of clarity serves to accentuate perception of a more dangerous present, 
which in turn legitimises the status quo of a liberal, expeditionary and activist West. 
 
Wider debate played out the same contradictions. In his warning against belief in 
certainty, the Commandant General of the Royal Marines noted 'our inability to either predict 
or contain events.'41 This did not stop him attempting 'crystal ball-gazing.' He claimed to 
know much about the future operating environment, prophesying that in the age of globalised 
connectivity, expeditionary special forces would have 'increasing value' as 'the logical force 
of choice', dictating the need to prioritise aircraft carriers and amphibious units over massed 
forces. Yet this confident claim ignored other possibilities. The coming of 'access-denial' 
military technologies, such as cheap sensors and munitions of greater range and precision 
could increase the vulnerability of amphibious forces attempting opposed landings.
42
 In its 
critique of SDSR, the Economist wanted it both ways. The country had to organise smarter 
for 'a dangerous and unpredictable world.'43  Yet this did not stop it claiming to know about 
the underlying probability distribution around likely threats. It faulted Britain for giving 'too 
high a priority' to the 'unlikely' prospect of fighting a 'sophisticated adversary', and too low a 
priority to the dangers spawned by 'failing states and religious and ethnic struggles.' This 
admitted risk – but not the uncertainty that ‘unpredictability’ implies. 
False confidence was apparent when Chancellor George Osborne dismissed the case 
for major legacy capabilities. 'We are going to have a bunch of kit that makes us extremely 
well prepared to fight the Russians on the north German plain. That's not a war we are likely 
to face.'44 But if, as his own government insists, the international system is increasingly 
'uncertain', how could he be so sure? Even if he is right, historically remote contingencies 
                                                            
39 NSS, p.3, 18.  
40Jussi M. Hanhimäki, 'The (really) good War: Cold War nostalgia and American foreign policy' Cold War 
History, 14:4 (2014), pp. 673–683. 
41 Buster Howes, 'Vast Ills Follow a Belief in Certainty' 12 May 2011, RUSI Journal 156:3 (2011), pp.20-25. 
42 Zachary Keck, 'Why D-Day would fail today: Modern Defence Technology has made seaborne invasions all 
the more difficult' The Diplomat 7 June 2014; Sydney J. Freedberg, 'Marines seek new Tech to get ashore 
against Missiles; Reinventing Amphib Assault' Breaking Defence 16 April 2014. 
43 'Missing in Action: Britain needs a strategy to make the best use of its shrinking military capabilities.' The 
Economist 8 March 2014. 
44 'Defence Budget Chaotic, says Chancellor George Osborne' BBC News 2 October 2010, at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11457956.  
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happen and the penalties for presuming against them can be severe. On the eve of the First 
World War, the British Army focused more on policing the North West Frontier than fighting 
a continental land war against the Kaiserreich. 
 
Both the SDSR and the NSS foretell nonlinearity, but project from the present into the 
future with assurance. Each assumes a prescience that is at odds with its claims that the world 
is radically complex. Despite protective clauses about the likelihood of surprise, each claims 
to know a great deal about the future, making contentious claims as though they are 
axiomatically true. Each elides two concepts, 'uncertainty' and 'risk', that are distinct. 
Uncertainty, in its classical conception, differs from the concept of 'risk' embedded in British 
defence planning. 'Risk' implies foreknowledge of underlying probability distribution, such as 
the 'Risk Register' which codes and weighs dangers before they materialise. 'Uncertainty', by 
contrast, represents un-measurable 'unknowables', a state made more radical by the leap into 
the mutual escalating violence of war.
45
 
 
For each claim about how the security environment 'is', security studies literature 
offers counter-claims, suggesting that the axioms of SDSR are less secure than policymakers 
assume. NSS assumes economic interconnectedness means that Britain's security is 
intimately tied to turbulence elsewhere, making conflict prevention vital. Yet there are 
arguments that even in times of economic interdependence, neutral third parties adapt and 
even benefit from others' conflicts.46 FCOC asserts that success in Afghanistan is vital for the 
UK's deterrence reputation. This 'past performance' theory of credibility assumes failure 
somewhere threatens core interests everywhere. But scholarship is divided on this point: there 
are equally robust arguments that credibility derives more from practical capabilities and 
perceived interest in a crisis. Conflicts can be discrete, and willingness to act in peripheral 
wars does not necessarily deter direct aggression elsewhere.
47
 In 1990-1 Britain joined an 
international coalition to halt aggression in the Gulf, but this did not deter Serbian aggression 
in Kosovo in 1999, and intervention there did not deter Al Qaeda in 2001. 
 
Each document assumes Britain must intervene because it has vital security interests 
at stake in preventing states failing and becoming incubators of terrorism. But this truism, 
                                                          
45 See Jonathan Kirshner, 'The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist Alternative' 
World   Politics   67:1   (2015),   pp.155-183,   178,   156. 
46 Eugene Gholz, 'Assessing the 'Threat' of International Tension to the U.S. Economy' in Christopher A. Preble 
& John Mueller (eds.) A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security (Washington DC: 
Cato Institute, 2014), pp.209-221; Eugene Gholz & Daryl Press, 'Why it Doesn't Pay to Preserve the Peace' 
Security Studies 10:4 (2001), pp.1-57.  
47 Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2007). 
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expressed as though it were straightforwardly the case, is highly contested. There is a 
plausible alternative view, that violent vacuums of power are generally unsafe for most 
people in them, and are not reliable hosts for plotting complex large scale attacks abroad. 
Terrorist groups need a baseline of political order, access to resources and functioning 
infrastructure to operate securely from.48 Most effective terrorists do not operate from 'failed 
states' but come from strongly governed states such as Saudi Arabia, or Afghanistan when it 
was a strongly governed theocracy, and most failed states do not host organisations that back 
terrorism.49 The role of benign 'prevention' also presumes foreknowledge about which cases 
will fail. Yet scholars working with data-rich models and collaborative expert groups to make 
'point predictions' about specific crises report that 'for every high-risk case that suffers a 
crisis, there is usually at least a handful of them that don't, and occasionally a supposedly 
low-risk case that just plain surprises us.'50 
 
Visions of the UK as a prescient intervening force fly in the face of the decidedly 
mixed record of interventions to remake foreign societies. Interventions can achieve their 
goals at acceptable cost. But a sizeable share of them lengthen rather than shorten civil wars, 
make them more bloody rather than less, and only rarely promote stable democratic 
evolution.51 External support for rebel groups in civil wars can be counter-productive, arms 
transfers are difficult to channel to the 'right' targets, and the complexities of finding and 
vetting 'moderate' rebel groups are considerable.
52
 The UK recently donated millions of 
pounds to Rwanda, in a joint commitment 'to the promotion of peace and stability in the 
Great Lakes Region', funds that were misspent to support M23 rebels in the Congo.53 
SDSR's agenda of preventing state failure assumes, as a liberal assumption, that injecting 
more resources, elections and markets will forestall conflict. Yet the opposite can be the 
case. The actions of 'global cops' are subject to the very disorder they identify in unruly 
neighbourhoods. 
 
                                                            
48 Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats and International Society (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2011), p.62. 
49 Anna Simons & David Tucker, 'The Misleading Problem of Failed States: a 'socio-geography' of terrorism in 
the post-9/11 era.' Third World Quarterly 28:2 (2007), pp.387-401, 388-389; Edward Newman, 'Weak States, 
State Failure and Terrorism' Terrorism and Political Violence 19:4 (2007), pp. 463-488, 481, 483; Michael 
Mazarr, 'The Rise and Fall of the State Failure Paradigm: Requiem for a Decade of Distraction' Foreign Affairs 
93:1 (2014), pp.113-122, p.116. 
50 Jay Ulfelder, 'Why the World Can't Have a Nate Silver' Foreign Policy 8 November 2012.  
51 Patrick Regan, ‘Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts’ Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 46:1 (2002), pp. 55-73; Reed M. Wood, Jacob Kathman & Stephen E. Gent, ‘Armed intervention and 
civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts’ Journal of Peace Research 49:5 (2012), pp. 647-660; Jonathan 
Monten & Alexander Downes, 'Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to 
Democratization' International Security 37:4 (2013), pp.90-131.  
52 'Networks of Third-Party Interveners and Civil War Duration,' European Journal of International Relations 
18:3 (2012), pp.573–597. 
53 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda' (Revised 2012) Section 2.1.  
Page 12 of 29
Cambridge University Press
European Journal of International Security
For Peer Review
13 
 
SDSR makes heroic assumptions about the harmony of interests between interveners 
and those they seek to help. It assumes that in helping host governments defeat forces of 
rebellion and disorder, both share an interest in providing legitimate, representative and 
disinterested governance, and that this can be provided through 'capacity building', 
overseeing the creation of services, training personnel, and the building of institutions, while 
securing the population. This turned out not to be the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Host 
governments can operate as patronage networks or sectarian regimes extracting resources 
from their population to benefit their clients.54 Resources flowing in to bolster governance 
can fuel corruption and implicate the occupier, stoking resistance and hardening division. If a 
host government is predatory on its population, for instance, this can undermine security 
sector reform. In Iraq, because a Shiite regime governed in sectarian ways to alienate Sunni 
communities, $26 billion of investment in the military, police and justice system (including 
about $12 billion on supplying the Iraqi army)55 over a decade created a force that collapsed 
and fled in the face of the Islamic State's offensive.  
 
The criticism is not that the SDSR should have solved the insoluble problem of 
unpredictability and unintended consequences. Rather, it spoke of uncertainty while carrying 
an ideology replete with confident predictions. SDSR predicted a certain, inexorable process 
of globalization that will make the international security environment ever more 
unpredictable. It predicted, nevertheless, that the disciplining hand of Western power would 
be needed to prevent unforeseeable dangers, exempting British actions from the nonlinearities 
of the international system. 
 
To anticipate an objection, it could be countered that SDSR was not primarily the 
result of an ideology of western power, but of bureaucratic politics. It could be argued that 
SDSR jumbled ideas in a problematic way because it was mainly an imperfect, compromised 
bi-product of political wrangling between various constituencies within the Ministry of 
Defence, the newly formed National Security Council (NSC) in the Cabinet Office, and the 
Treasury. Were this the case, however, we would expect to see greater ideological plurality 
before the SDSR began and imposed its pressures. What we actually see, however, is that the 
                                                            
54 On the misalignment of interests problem, see Stephen Biddle, 'Afghanistan's Legacy: Emerging Lessons of 
an Ongoing War' The Washington Quarterly 37:2 (2014), pp.73-86, pp.80-81. 
55 Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Learning From Iraq: A Final Report From the 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (Washington DC: 2013), pp.90-105. 
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problematic vision of uncertainty predated SDSR, and the government that conducted it. 
That the civilian and military leaders of the defence community had already absorbed the 
ideology is demonstrated by the content of the Ministry of Defence ‘Green Paper’ published 
beforehand in February 2010. Like the SDSR it anticipated, the paper identified a world of 
radical uncertainty, anticipating that it will get harder to predict, with the greater turbulence 
of the environment placing a limitation on the capacity to identify future challenges and 
foresee the types of military operations needed. Yet it reported that conflict prevention had 
contributed to a ‘stable rules based international order’, foresaw that Al Qaeda and its 
associates were likely to remain the main threat to the UK, (a claim that is becoming harder 
to sustain), and called for more effective horizon scanning. This reflected the same 
ideological construct that informed SDSR: when talking about the external environment, the 
Green Paper described an unstable and unpredictable world. When talking about British 
action in that world, it exuded confidence in British capacity for foresight.56 Moreover, prior 
strategic documents anticipated SDSR’s anticipatory and preventive logic, from the 1998 
Strategic Defence Review to the Cabinet Office’ National Security Strategy of 2008 to the 
FCO’s adaptation plan for Climate Change earlier in 2010.57 The chronology, in other words, 
suggests that SDSR cannot have been the mere product of an immediate, internal 
bureaucratic struggle in an ideological vacuum. As critiques of bureaucratic politics suggests, 
even people committed to ‘where they sit’ within government bring with them prior beliefs 
and cognitive maps.
58
 To make their case, each stakeholder had to appeal to an already-
formed, cross-government consensus. Bureaucrats fought, but within strong ideological 
parameters. Although accelerated, SDSR carried assumptions long in the making. 
 
SDSR functioned partly as a revision of defence spending in response to shifting 
material conditions. But it was also the occasion for the articulation of ideas about British 
power in the world, identifying chaos as an externality 'out there' needing to be tamed into 
order by a benign, prescient guardian. As Rory Stewart MP defined it, this was a problem not 
of resources but of thought, a refusal to recognise that defence planning is at root a political 
process that should engage difficult questions about the national interest, to 'decide where we 
are prepared to be involved, and what, fundamentally, our national interests should be.'59 
                                                            
56 Ministry of Defence, Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review (Cm 7794, 
February 2010), pp.17-22, 14, 28, 30.  
57 MOD Strategic Defence Review (London, 1998); Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the 
United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World (London, 2008); FCO, Preparing for Global Climate 
Change: An Adaptation Plan for the FCO (London, 2010).  
58 On the ‘prior beliefs’ critique of bureaucratic politics models, see James M. Goldgeier, ‘Psychology and 
Security’ Security Studies 6 (1997), pp.137-166; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien 
Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton University Press, 1992).  
59 Rory Stewart, Hansard 26 Jan 2012 Column 500.  
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 The problematic approach to uncertainty in SDSR is part of a wider problem in 
national security bureaucracies on both sides of the Atlantic. Successive Presidents in 
Washington stress uncertainty but criticise intelligence agencies for failing to forecast highly 
contingent events. President Barack Obama pronounced on unpredictability,60 yet criticised 
the Central Intelligence Agency for failing to foresee one of the most unpredictable 
phenomena in politics, revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Iraq.61 Revolutions are difficult to 
forecast because the political will of crowds is fluid and 'triggering events' by definition 
cannot be foretold. Bush Administration memoirs too invoke 'uncertainty' but blame 
intelligence agencies for failing to forecast the 9/11 attacks, implying there was enough 
certainty after all to distinguish the signal from the noise.
62
 Yet failure to anticipate surprise 
attacks is caused mostly not by imperfections in intelligence-gathering, but in prior political 
disbelief and misinterpretation of ambiguous information,63 brought on by the desensitising 
effects of false alarms, the reluctance to acknowledge inconvenient possibilities, or fear of 
escalating a crisis. Because surprise is rooted not in systems but in politics, ever-greater 
volumes of data cannot eradicate it.  
Attempts to eliminate uncertainty can be pernicious. In 2002-3, despite tentative and 
conflicting evidence, the British government decided it 'knew' Iraq possessed a growing 
WMD programme and, despite warnings, underestimated the costs and complexities of war, 
foisting certainty on an uncertain environment by relying ultimately on overconfident 
assumptions about the shape of things to come. 
 
Part II: Realism and Nonlinearity 
 
 
Given the difficulties within the contemporary movement to place ‘risk management’ at the 
                                                            
60 Obama referred to 'our inability to predict the future.' Defence Strategic Guidance: Sustaining US Global 
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defence (January 2012), p.6; on 'danger and uncertainty', President 
Barack Obama, 'Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony' 
28 May 2014; 'American leadership is the one constant in an uncertain world' in 'Statement by the President on 
ISIL' 10 September 2014.  
61 'Obama 'Disappointed by Intel on Arab Unrest' CBS News 4 February 2011; Bill Gertz, 'CIA Blew it in Iraq, 
blamed for failing to warn about rise of Islamic State' Washington Times 1 July 2014. 
62 Melvyn P. Leffler, 'The Foreign Policies of the George W. Bush Administration: Memoirs, History, Legacy', 
Diplomatic History 37:2 (2013), pp.190-216; George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 239, 234, 237, 269; 
George W. Bush, Decision Points, pp.153, 159; John Ashcroft, Never Again, p.125. 
63 Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution 
Press, 1982); Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), pp.64-5. 
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heart of national security, I now argue that classical realism is a valuable resource, both as a 
check on the ideology of bringing order into chaos, and as a positive route to pursuing 
prudence beyond ‘predicting better.’ I ground this argument in the writings of two realists 
who hammered out theories through their own political commitments: Clausewitz as a 
reformist agitator in nineteenth century Prussia and Morgenthau as an 'uneasy realist' in 
America during the Cold War. Both aimed at the cultivation of practical wisdom, or 
sensitivity to the dilemmas and consequences of action. 
 
Uncertainty is at the core of the classical realist tradition that stretches from 
Thucydides to Hans Morgenthau.
64
 For all realists, life is insecure and defined by the 
possibility of war because the world is anarchic, lacking a supreme, supranational 
sovereign.65 Without a Leviathan to keep the peace, anarchy places a premium on self-help. 
Uncertainty breeds insecurity by creating the problem of 'other minds.'
66
 While new 
technology and refinement of method may yield modest improvements in forecasting, 
uncertainty is an irreducible feature of politics that has more profound causes than the crudity 
of our forecasting instruments. As this fog is inescapable, planners should prepare 'for the 
high probability of predictive failure.'67 How? 
 
Classical realism, more than its ‘neo’ realist descendants, is attentive to the need to go 
beyond prediction and develop prudence within the limitations of foreknowledge. It begins 
not from ‘a rejection of the scientific study of politics but a conservative regard for what 
social science can hope to achieve.’68 It seeks to fuse power politics with 'principles of 
agency, prudence and the recognition of limitations'69, and takes 'the political' seriously, 
noting that choice and contingency play havoc with elegant systems that look for determined 
regularity. In this tradition, there is no technocratic escape from the dilemma of uncertainty. 
Thus we should be wary of the pursuit of ‘agility’, a pervasive concept in current debate.70 
                                                            
64 Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003).  
65 On anarchy in realist traditions, see Joseph M. Parent & Joshua M. Baron, 'Elder Abuse: How the Moderns 
Mistreat Classical Realism' International Studies Review 13 (2011), pp.193-213.  
66 Martin Hollis & Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 1990), pp.171-176. 
67 Richard Danzig, Driving in the Dark: Ten Propositions about Prediction and National Security (Washington 
DC: Center for a New American Security, 2011), p.9. 
68 Kirshner, ‘Economic Sins’, p.178. 
69 Andrew R. Hom & Brent J. Steele, 'Open Horizons: The Temporal Visions of Reflexive Realism' 
International Studies Review 12:2 (2010), pp.271-300, p.271. 
70 According to US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, American forces must embrace agility because they have 
'never once gotten it right' about the nature and location of future wars: Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defence 
Speech, Westpoint, 25 February 2011,  
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Agility sharpens the sword, but don't define the purpose, or hierarchy of interests, for which 
the sword should be used.71 Alternatively, the appeal for a 'balanced force' implies political 
choices without addressing them, increasing flexibility but sacrificing the 'weight' that can be 
applied.72 Decisions about hedging, risk or efficiency ultimately must confront a political 
argument, about what is worth bleeding for. 
Classical realism, like all realism, begins in pessimism from acknowledgement of the 
reality of power and the enduring insecurity of the world. But it is distinctive in three regards. 
It sees systemic pressures as constraining but indeterminate; recognises the force of ideas and 
domestic politics in driving state behaviour; and treats politics as uncertain, contingent and 
subject to the will of agents. Where 'structural' realists treat the system as its own autonomous 
thing that disposes and constrains unit behaviour, classical realists regard power 'balancing' 
and equilibrium as normative commitments reliant on the will of actors.73 In common with 
‘chaos’ theorists,74 classical realists are sceptical about the predictive promise of universal 
theories, reject the notion that willed human behaviour can be diagnosed with the precision of 
the natural sciences, and are historicist in their emphasis on the peculiarities of situations. 
They seek possibilities through historical comparison, but are modest about what social 
science can yield. Actors may be mostly 'rational', but there are many rationalities. 
Calculating minds can draw conflicting lessons from the same information. What causes or 
provokes war in one setting can prevent or deter it in another. There is no sure way of fixing 
which 'lessons' apply, or when. Agents have discretion, some of whom are entrepreneurial 
and can recognise and alter patterns. Even if we had a complete theory of the causes of war, 
actors could recursively break the pattern. The future is 'largely unwritten.'75 
 
Prussian general and theorist Carl von Clausewitz is a useful point of contrast with 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
athttp://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539; for a similarly technocratic emphasis on 
flexibility, see Talbot C. Imlay & Monica Duffy Toft (eds.) The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and 
Strategic Planning under Uncertainty (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.249-261. 
71 On this point see Colin S. Gray, Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), p.203. 
72 Hugh White, 'The New Defence White Paper: Why We Need it and What it needs to do' Lowy Institute Paper, 
April 2008, pp.3-4. 
73 See Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Question of Realism: An Historians View' Security Studies 13:1 (2003), pp.156-
194; Jonathan Kirshner, 'The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical Realism and the rise of China' European 
Journal of International Relations 18:1 (2010), pp.53-75, pp.66-69. 
74 James Der Derian & Michael Shapiro, International-Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World 
Politics (Lexington, 1989); Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998). 
75 Jonathan Kirshner, 'The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of China' European 
Journal of International Relations 18:1 (2010), pp.53-75, p.54. 
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the logic of contemporary strategic planning. Contrary to some interpretations, he was neither 
a prototypical ‘chaos’ theorist surrendering to ‘non-linearity’, nor a rigid statist married to the 
instrumentality of war. As with SDSR, both chaos and control featured centrally in his 
writing, but unlike SDSR, Clausewitz was consciously conflicted by the opposing realities of 
both. 
 
On the one hand, the experience of shock was fundamental to his career. 'In the next 
great battle we will be the winner', he advised his future wife Marie, before Napoleon 
smashed Prussia in 1806.
76
 Clausewitz's theory was the product of the shocks of experience, 
in particular the failure of the 'god of war' Napoleon. As a young officer, he was awed by the 
commander who harnessed the power of the French Revolution to unleash 'all its raw 
violence.'77 But what worked for Napoleon at one time failed later. His 'puzzle' was that 'the 
same principles and strategies that were the decisive foundation of Napoleon's initial 
successes proved inadequate' in the different contexts of the Russian campaign and at 
Waterloo.78 This variation in outcome from the same ‘input’ did not lead him to create a 
predictive model, but to an unresolved attempt to reconcile war's contradictory patterns. 
Initially impressed by the radical expansion of violence and the principle of destruction, the 
warlike spirit unleashed from political conditions by adroit states, he later stressed the need to 
limit violence and subordinate it to policy. 
 
Dynamic interactions - 'the collision of two living forces'- put events into motion that 
are hard to foresee, and the drive to escalation deprives both of control.79 Uncertainty also fed 
on the uniqueness of each situation, the variation of context that precluded certain 
foreknowledge and made a mockery of efforts to reduce war to systematic formulas. A 
commander had to navigate 'in the dark', through an uncharted sea full of unseen reefs.80 If 
war is an imprecise craft, he doubted attempts at systemic control. On this basis he attacked 
'system builders' attempts to convert campaigning into a detailed prescriptive system 'like an 
external law or an algebraic formula' he assailed Bulow's geometrical system of envelopment, 
Dumas' geological formula of victory via higher ground, Jomini's engineering model of a 
system of internal lines and Henry Lloyd's use of mathematical calculations and rules to 
                                                            
76 Clausewitz to Marie, 29 September 1806, Karl und Marie von Clausewitz: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und 
Tagebuchblättern (ed. Karl Linnebach, Berlin: Warneck, 1916), p.64. 
77 Clausewitz, 'On the Life and Character of Scharnhorst' 1817, Paret Political and Historical Writings. 
78 Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press,) p.2. 
79 Clausewitz, On War, 1:1 p.77. 
80 Clausewitz, On War, 2:2, p.139. 
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predict behaviour. To Clausewitz, they overlooked the singularity of each context, lost sight 
of cognitive and emotional variables, as well as chance, and failed to account for the general 
unreliability of information.81 Both the acquisition and exploitation of information, like 
wartime intelligence, was elusive. Information deficiency was a cause of war. Would Prussia 
in 1806 'have risked war with France with 100,000 men, if she had suspected that the first 
shot would set off a mine that was to blow her to the skies?'82 In this, he anticipated theories 
that conflict is rooted in a lack of clarity and disagreement about relative strength.83 
 
For all this, Clausewitz did not give up on the possibility of exerting some control. He 
did anticipate ‘non-linearity’ in his picture of the dynamic uncertainty of war.84 But had he 
believed preparation a waste of time, he hardly would have identified the intellectual qualities 
a commander would need to plan operations.85 Some claim Clausewitz was the source of the 
aphorism of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, that 'no plan survives contact with the 
enemy.'86 But the Moltkean tradition towards planning, like Clausewitz's, was consciously 
torn. Moltke's statement translates as 'No plan of operations extends with any certainty 
beyond the first contact with the main hostile force.'87 Inherent to warfare were the 
vicissitudes generated by weather, accident or misperception, and the collision of 
independent wills, making it a conceit to suppose that one 'can see in the course of the 
campaign the consequent execution of an original idea with all details thought out in advance 
and adhered to until the very end.'88 Strategic wisdom did not counsel the abandonment of 
plans, but 'the continued development of the original leading thought in accordance with the 
constantly changed circumstances.'89  
 
 Clausewitz too promoted the aspiration for a rational intelligence approximating 
                                                            
81 On War, p.168, on unreliable information p.140; 'On the Life and Character of Scharnhorst' Historical and 
Political Writings pp.103-104; Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz & Contemporary War (Oxford:  
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82 On War, p. 581. 
83 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1988), pp. 109-114. 
84 Alan J. Beyerchen, 'Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War' International Security, 17:3 
(1992), pp.59-90. 
 
85 Terence M. Holmes, 'Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz's On War' Journal of Strategic Studies 30:1 
(2007), pp.129-151. 
86 Moltke is attributed with this statement in Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from 
Antiquity to the Present (2010), p.16; Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford university 
Press, 2014), p.104. 
87 Helmuth von Moltke, 'Ueber Strategie' Militataerische Werke, ed. Großer Generalstab, Abteilung fuer 
Kriegsgeschichte I, Vol. II, 2, Moltkes taktischstrategische Aufsatze aus den Jahren 1857 bis 1871 (Berlin: 
Mittler 1900), pp.291–2. 
88 Helmuth von Moltke, 'Plan of Operations' ('Operationsplan-Kriegsobjekt und Operationsobjekt'), cited and 
translated in Daniel J. Hughes, Moltke on the art of war: Selected Writings (Novato: Presidio Press, 1993), 
pp.91-94 p.92. 
89 'On Strategy' from Militaerische Werke, translated in Hughes, Moltke, pp.44-47, p.47. 
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control, and exploiting contingency. Planning should encompass calculations of essential 
political objectives, and the overall relation between different parts, but should allow for 
friction, leaving room for adjustment. War plans were needed to determine the character of 
the conflict, 'on the basis of probabilities.'90
 
Small things undermined campaigns only in the 
absence of a coherent overall strategic aim. Clausewitz framed planning not as an inflexible 
sequencing of moves, but as the attempt to comprehend the possibilities in particular 
situations. Qualities of planners mattered as much as the planning, both the intellectual 
capacity to synthesise elements of conflict and the emotional capacity to drive a vision. 
Preparation was hard but not futile. To frame Clausewitz as a nineteenth century Romantic 
framing war as 'a game of chance outside the bounds of rational control'91 does violence to 
his evolving comprehension. 
 
Clausewitz's theory of war was also a theory of pedagogy, or how decision-makers 
should educate themselves. He believed his method of Kritik, or tracing cause-and-effect 
relationships towards coherent theory, was the kind of thought- system that thinking 
commanders needed in wartime, with theory helping to identify and exploit the 
unexpected.92 He emphasised that studying past campaigns had an indirect value as an aid to 
judgement. Its value lay not in the pursuit of systemic 'lessons learned' prescriptions, as this 
would ignore the historicity of war and the singularity of each war. It was to cultivate the 
mind of the commander. Through experiential rather than abstract learning, education 
should produce decision-makers with a 'rational will.' Thus his analysis of the 1814 
campaign in France was supposed to help 'form the practical man' and 'educate his 
judgement, rather than to assist him directly in the execution of his tasks.'
93
 At the lower 
level, routine and systems were valuable ways to reduce friction. But to routinise the higher 
level of strategic planning threatened to impoverish the imagination. This is precisely what 
happened at Jena-Auerstedt in 1806, where Prussia's attempt to recreate Frederick the 
Great's oblique order of battle met disaster.94 If a commander brought to experience 'ready-
made ideas' more than an educated intellect, 'the flow of events will simply tear down his 
house before it is finished.'95 
 
                                                            
90 Clausewitz, On War, Book 8, p.584 
91 ‘John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic’, in War in History, 1:3 (1994), 
pp.319-336. 
92 On War, p.168.  
93 Clausewitz, 'Strategic Critique of the Campaign of 1814 in France', Paret Political and Historical Writings, 
pp.205-235, p.208. 
94 On War, 2.4, p.155. 
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The same approach drove Clausewitz's efforts to reform the curriculum at the 
Prussian War College (Allgemeine Kriegsschule) for advanced study for officers. In March 
1819, Clausewitz wrote a memorandum arguing that the College should de-emphasise rote 
learning and formal lectures, in favour of more practical classes that made students interact as 
active participants.96 For instance, instead of presenting geography and campaigning in an 
abstract or arithmetical way, students should make a 'model of the earth's surface' as a more 
engaging approach than 'dry and empty speculation.'97
 
In contemporary terms, it flowed from 
the ideal of Bildung, or education as the cultivation of character and intellect with theory as a 
contemplative basis for guidance rather than mechanical prescription.
98
 In today's terms, he 
recommended the 'applicatory method' of experiential learning. This was to restore 
Scharnhorst's ambition for the Kriegsschule, not to pass on knowledge with authority but 'to 
train intelligence and development judgement.'99 Invoking Clausewitz, contemporary officers 
argue for making friction central to military exercises, inserting 'imperfect information, 
rushed timelines, conflicting reports, rapid changes in operations, loss of key leadership, 
sleep deprivation, ethical decisions, and maintenance and logistical issues.'100 Ultimately, 
learning should form intuitive, situational judgement to cope with war's singularity, 
developing what Michael Howard called 'the capacity to adapt oneself to the utterly 
unpredictable, the entirely unknown.'
101
 
 
Defence planning in Clausewitz was inextricable from political struggle, as military 
power in his view derived from the social cohesion and civic unity of the nation. Clausewitz 
was politically active, belonging to the Prussian Militärische Gesellschaft established by his 
mentor Scharnhorst in 1801 and the Tugendbund, a patriotic circle of Berlin intellectuals 
founded in 1808 to revive the national spirit. At the higher political level, to engage in 
defence planning was inescapably to confront the existential political choices of the nation-
state. His 1819 memorandum defending the continuation of the reformed army addressed a 
central policy dilemma, whether to arm the people, and the problem of judging whether the 
state was more imperilled by invasion or revolution. The Landwehr or supplementary 
people's army was both affordable and represented the harmonisation of politics and military 
policy, and alone was capable of 'harnessing the raw, element power of war.'102 But 
                                                            
96 Ludwig von Scharfenort, Die Koniglich Preussische Kriegsakademi, 1810-1910 (Berlin: Mittler, 1910), 30-
41; Paret, Clausewitz, pp.272-279. 
97 Memorandum, cited in Scharfenort, p.41. 
98 T.G. Otte, 'Educating Bellona: Carl von Clausewitz and Military Education' in Keith Nelson and Greg 
Kennedy (eds.) Military Education: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Praeger, 2002), pp.13-33, pp.14, 
p.21. 
99 Paret, Clausewitz, p.273.  
100 Lt. Col. Jonathan Due, Maj. Nathan Finney, Maj. Joe Byerly, 'Preparing Soldiers for Uncertainty', Military 
Review (Jan-Feb 2015), pp.26-30, p.28. 
101 Michael Howard, 'Military Science in an Age of Peace' RUSI 119 (1974), pp.3-9. 
102 Unsere Kriegsverfassung', Clausewitz Politische Schriften und Briefe pp.142-153. 
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perpetuating it meant arming the people. Against the argument that the Landwehr increased 
the danger of revolution, he argued that in fact it brought army and people closer together to 
support an emerging nation. The government, as a constitutional monarchy, should enact 
liberal reforms to gathering around it 'representatives of the people' to generate political 
consent. 
 
In contrast to modern conceptions of contingency as a destabilising and threatening 
unknown, Clausewitz stressed the positive exploitation of fortune. It made sense to postpone 
some decisions. In trying to discern the future, Clausewitz divined from current political 
conditions what could and could not be known. Consider his agitations regarding the debate 
over the proposed German Federal Army in 1818. On one level, he argued that the multiple 
sovereign states of the federation should distinguish between military strength and unified 
command. In line with his view that military institutions should reflect as accurately as 
possible the political forces that animate and direct them, he proposed that they work for an 
agreed ratio of armed forces and fortresses and their populations, to be reviewed by a 
Commission under the authority of a Federal Diet. At the same time, he resisted the call for a 
pre-arranged federal army that would be at odds with the political reality that different states 
would have distinct interests in the event of a war. At this point he argued against too much 
planning, suggesting it would be wiser to wait until war broke out to judge its distinctive 
context, only then making arrangements for forces ' 'disposition and combination.' So long as 
adequate ratios of military power were sustained, he argued German states should 'abandon to 
the force of circumstances, the interests of the moment, the innumerable constellations of 
chance under whose every act of human history is made and accomplished...to abandon to 
these living and active forces the formulation of plans, the choice of means, and the assembly 
of the various parts that go into the great machine of war.'103
 
Prudent preparation meant 
balancing the need for sufficient force with the capacity to adapt to the play of circumstances. 
It meant making some decisions and delaying others, to lessen the dangers of unpredictability 
by pushing choices closer to the future, when there would be more information about 
evolving alliances. 
 
Unlike Clausewitz, who intellectually was foremost a theorist of the nature of war, 
Hans Morgenthau's was a theorist of international politics. But Morgenthau too grounded his 
                                                            
103 'On the German Federal Army' 1818, cited in Paret, Clausewitz: Political and Historical Writings pp.304-
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scepticism about predictive science in an account of the limitations of knowledge, and in a 
concern for the pedagogical purpose of political science in public life. Like Clausewitz he 
was an educator with a strong sense of vocation, an active citizen conscious of how civil 
society shaped and was shaped by his country's diplomacy.104 He evolved a theory of 
international politics through a textbook that he regularly updated, Politics Among Nations.
105
 
In laying out the role of the political theorist, Morgenthau decried 'scientific man' or the 
emerging positivist social science of the behavioural revolution, with its removal of human 
agency from political life and its mechanistic conception of politics itself. The proper 
purpose of academics was not to prescribe neat predictive solutions but offer a 'higher 
practicality' to public life, deepening understanding of problems.106 The 'first lesson' of 
international politics was 'the ambiguity of the facts', which denied 'trustworthy prophecies' 
to makers of strategy.
107
 Practitioners were therefore more gamblers than scientists.
108
 
 
Morgenthau's critique of America's war in Vietnam was an assault on the attempt to 
‘scientise’ national security planning. He cautioned against the Pentagon's adaptation of 
Thomas Schelling's theories of game-theoretic bargaining to the coercive bombardment of 
North Vietnam. Morgenthau overstated his case, attributing failure in Vietnam directly to a 
'dogmatic outlook in modern political science.'109
 
But for Morgenthau, the war reopened the 
divide between economistic paradigms that modelled actors as agents rationally pursuing 
material things and classical theories of power politics. The scientistic treatment of the social 
and natural worlds as equivalent subjects of investigation could not comprehend the 
historicity of war. War's primarily political nature with its intangible forces of morale and 
ideas meant that it was hard to subject to systematic knowledge in advance. Solutions to 
conflict could only be 'temporary and precarious', with peace subject to ever-changing 
conditions. History raged 'in the realm of the accidental, the contingent, the 
unpredictable.'110 In the schemas of game theorists, Vietnam appeared not as a real historical 
entity but as a rational abstraction whose every move was quantifiable in advance. Political 
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success was not reducible to physical metrics like 'bodycounts' or where village chiefs slept 
at night. He faulted military technicians for their apolitical conception of counterinsurgency, 
'as though it were just another branch of warfare, to be taught in special schools and applied 
with technical proficiency.'111 This anticipated critiques of 'high modernism', designs of 
social order to master nature, that discount possibilities of resistance.
112
 
 
Morgenthau didn't always take his own advice. Testifying to Congress between 1973-
1975, he prematurely announced that collaborative moves of Detente and Ostpolitik had 
liquidated the Cold War by relaxing ideological hostility and recognising the status quo.113 
He also shifted his stance on nuclear weapons. Their inception, and the end of America's 
nuclear monopoly in 1949, was a site of 'utter uncertainty' making only hunches possible. 
Because a nuclear war had never been fought, it was unclear how humanity would respond. 
Morgenthau first argued that nukes made war between nuclear states futile, then advocated 
preparing for graduated atomic war to offset Soviet conventional superiority, finally arguing 
that the prospect of nuclear death seemed to call for the creation of a world state to replace 
outmoded nation-states, a project he despaired as unlikely to succeed.114 His struggle to settle 
a position, and his falling back to the combination of a strong military combined with 
accommodating diplomacy, supports his judgement that the ambiguity of international life 
makes it hard to project unknowns beyond articulating interests, assessing competing 
possibilities and settling for unsatisfactory compromise. 
 
At the heart of Morgenthau's critique of scientism was a concept of prudence. For 
him, the 'supreme virtue' is to weigh the consequences of competing choices in concrete 
situations, negotiating the conflicting demands of interest and principle and knowing that all 
choices are bound to produce unexpected results.115 Some allege Morgenthau's prudence was 
coldly instrumental. Cold War realists like Morgenthau were nostalgia for elite guardians in 
the vein of nineteenth century European diplomats who made strategy in cold blood standing 
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above the herd. This earned him a reputation as continental reactionary.116 He called for the 
'decontamination' of America's ideological statecraft as the doctrine of containment became 
an indiscriminate commitment. But to bring power and commitments into harmony required a 
'restatement of national purpose'117 with goals ranked according to their essentiality and 
achievability. Arguing that 'a dissenting minority performs a vital function for the political 
and moral welfare of the Republic'118, he taught that government must both carry and shape 
opinion, avoiding the pitfalls of short-sighted populism or rigid inflexibility.119 Power was 
not a neatly measurable thing - the ability of the weak to challenge the strong demonstrated 
that -and drew on intangibles like morale and cohesion, relying on diplomacy to give material 
components 'direction and weight.' A realistic purpose should be worked out not through a 
Weberian charismatic autocrat, nor through a Schmittian politics of enmity, but through 
democratic and pluralist contestation. Grand strategy needed grand politics.
120
 Like 
Clausewitz, Morgenthau saw the state not as unitary but as a conflicted thing, shaped by 
internal sources of equilibrium. This followed the Aristotelian tradition, wherein a prudent 
agent moderates their desires in interacting within a political community, both domestically 
and internationally, in a never-ending struggle to negotiate their interest.121 Without a 
negotiated purpose, the polity's constitutive parts could disaggregate, or fall prey to 
demagoguery. 
 
Clausewitz and Morgenthau argued that there is no scientific or technocratic escape 
from the problems of uncertainty. Insofar as international politics is clouded in ambiguity, 
Western beholders themselves cannot transcend it. It might be objected that their critique 
cannot stand in a contemporary policy world that places high demand on scientific 
technology as the remedy for uncertainty, where polities expect their officials to process data 
in order to optimise policy choices.122 The target of these two classical realists, though, was 
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not science but scientism, the conceit of technology-driven anticipatory security. Clausewitz 
mocked attempts to systematise warfare into a series of prescriptive rules. Morgenthau did 
likewise in the arena of international politics. For both, preparation was vital, but must 
balance restraint and activity, insure against one’s own capacity for inducing disorder, and 
must take the form of a political contest over the nature of the polity’s interests. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In contemporary security debate, there is something more profound going on than a fear of 
the unknown. As I have demonstrated, in the major review of 2010, even while policymakers 
and practitioners articulated ‘uncertainty’ and emphasised that the present can be punctuated 
by sudden change, their vision was premised on an unexamined certainty, that the West 
brings order into chaos and is exempt from the nonlinearity around it. In the name of 
planning for uncertainty, governments do not fully address how uncertainty affects the 
purpose and utility of their power. 
 
Governments have little choice but to recognise uncertainty while making predictions. 
This is inevitable, and policymakers should still chance their arm. The difficulty lies in the 
misplaced confidence in one’s own knowledge, the failure to scrutinise assumptions being 
made, and the failure to insure against the unpredictability of one’s own actions and their 
consequences. In a time of botched interventions, development efforts gone wrong, and 
financial crisis, states should confront the problem that they themselves are implicated in 
their non-linearity that they perceive in the world around them. 
 
There are three ways states can take uncertainty more seriously.123 Firstly, as both 
Clausewitz and Morgenthau argued, they should develop the intellectual capability to think 
the unthinkable. One technique is to use dynamic simulation exercises against active 
adversaries to imagine the failure of current policy and the assumptions that underpin it from 
a ‘shadow national security strategy’ at the top, all the way down to crisis scenario 
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simulation. States do ‘war game’ scenarios, but are too politically constrained. More robust 
exercises introduce the unpalatable (such as an Iranian nuclear bomb, a plot line that offends 
the UK-US current stance of non-proliferation).124 The goal of simulation is not primarily to 
‘dress rehearse’ hypothetical crises, as we can’t know what future ones will be and are bound 
to forecast badly. Its value is to condition policymakers through thought experimentation to 
make informed choices under pressure, to accelerate inter-department and interagency 
cohesion, to spot overlooked potentialities, and to test and probe assumptions. 
 
 
Secondly, given the limits of forecasting even in the era of ‘big data’ and refined risk-
assessment techniques, states should retain ‘worse case’ capabilities to deter and, if needed, 
scale up to fight. In an era of resource scarcity and downward pressure on budgets, they 
should attend first to ‘vital’ interests (that is, necessary for life) above what is merely 
desirable, putting major war capabilities over those designed for lesser missions. This would 
anticipate the abrupt breaking of trends, like the shift from years focussed on counter-
terrorism and counterinsurgency, to the recent and more dangerous resurgence of geopolitical 
competition between states. Contrary to the repeated logic of prevention being better than 
cure, states’ abilities to prevent problems without blowback are limited, meaning that it is 
equally vital to husband the ability to react with reserve ‘surplus’ power. 
 
Finally, states can choose to engage the difficult debate about the ‘national interest’ 
before sudden crises force them to. Planning wisely means building the capacity to interpret 
and respond to contingency. If anticipatory thinking is intrinsic to preparation, states cannot 
do without it, and need 'a coherent framework of purpose and direction' where the unexpected 
'can be interpreted, given meaning and responded to.'125 Classical realism locates that effort in 
the struggle over the national interest. Strategy is not a technical instrumental exercise by 
unitary states responding to structural forces, but is embedded in political contestation. 
Building the ability to respond to contingency is part of a wider debate over what is worth 
bleeding for. Arguments about defence should not be divorced from arguments over national 
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purpose, ultimately about the kind of polity a community wants to be. In classical realism, 
defence is not a technical specialism practised by a professional class but part of the struggle 
to define the common good. Preparation rests on a balance between shaping the environment 
and building the capacity to react, through a shared account of what is valued and achievable. 
Attention to classical traditions cannot enhance prediction, but can help go beyond it. 
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